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Abstract
This paper introduces heterogeneous expectations into a New Keynesian
model. Our primary theoretical contribution is to provide an aggregation re-
sult for a micro-founded model with nominal rigidities and heterogeneous ex-
pectations. We show that equilibrium output and inﬂation are solutions to
a heterogeneous expectations version of the New Keynesian reduced form re-
lations. With heterogeneous agents, the Phillips curve depends on current
expectations of both contemporaneous and future endogenous state variables.
As an illustration of the potential importance of heterogeneity, we show that
incorporating heterogeneous expectations into the New Keynesian model may
signiﬁcantly alter its determinacy properties: models that are determinate un-
der the assumption of rationality may possess multiple equilibria in the presence
of expectations heterogeneity, even for small departures from rationality.
JEL Classiﬁcations: E52; E32; D83; D84
Key Words: Heterogeneous expectations, monetary policy, adaptive learning, aggre-
gation.
1 Introduction
During the past decade the New Keynesian monetary model has become a bench-
mark laboratory for the analysis of monetary policy. Despite a literature that has
∗We are grateful to Chuck Carlstrom, Larry Christiano, George Evans, and Glenn Rudebusch
for suggestions. We also thank Fabio Milani and seminar participants at San Francisco FRB and
Cleveland FRB for comments.
1coordinated on this model, there is a surprisingly diverse set of policy advice: some
advocate simple, implementable policy rules (McCallum and Nelson (1999), Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2005)); optimal state-contingent monetary policy (Giannoni and
Woodford (2002), Woodford (2003), Benigno and Woodford (2005)); or, inﬂation
targeting or inﬂation forecast targeting (Svensson (1999), Svensson and Woodford
(2003), Svensson and Williams (2005)). One theme emerging from this literature is
that policy should account for its eﬀect on private-sector expectations of future policy
actions. Indeed, Woodford (2006) emphasizes the role policy inertia plays in inﬂu-
encing expectations. Even in the presence of non-rational agents, it is still advised
that policy be set while remaining cognizant of the feedback onto beliefs, though
often with the added condition that the associated rational expectations equilibrium
(REE) is stable under learning (Bullard and Mitra (2002)).
The emergence of this theme stems from models that assume a representative
agent structure and homogeneous private-sector expectations.1 This assumption is
widespread despite increasing evidence that agents have heterogeneous expectations.
For example, Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2003) document disagreement among both
consumers and professional economists in survey data on inﬂation expectations. Car-
roll (2003) shows that information slowly diﬀuses through the economy. Branch (2004,
2005) ﬁnds that survey data on inﬂation expectations are consistent with a dynamic
discrete choice between statistical predictor functions. The dynamic eﬀect of expecta-
tions heterogeneity, though, has not yet been studied in the context of micro-founded
monetary models. This paper introduces heterogeneous expectations into a New Key-
nesian framework and studies its implications for the dynamic equilibrium properties
of the economy.
This paper’s principal contribution is it provides a theory of heterogeneous expec-
tations that generalizes the literature on monetary policy in New Keynesian models
to a framework with an empirically realistic model of expectation formation. We
derive a heterogeneous expectations version of the New Keynesian model employing
micro-foundations along the lines of Woodford (2003).2 The aggregation of hetero-
geneous expectations into a reduced form from micro-foundations is non-trivial, and
we make explicit the conditions under which aggregation obtains.
Surprisingly, our formulation of heterogeneous expectations leads to a reduced
form similar to the standard IS and AS relations except that conditional expecta-
tions are replaced by a general expectations operator that is a convex combination of
heterogeneous expectations. Also, depending on the behavior of boundedly rational
1Heterogeneous expectations between the policymakers and the private sector have been analyzed
by Honkapohja and Mitra (2006) and Sargent (1999).
2Gali, Lopez-Sallido, and Valles (2004) develop a model with rational and myopic agents. The
heterogeneity is in consumption-saving behavior rather than expectations. In our model, all agents
solve the same problem, have the same utility function, and face the same constraints. They diﬀer,
however, in how they evaluate their utility ﬂows, which may imply diﬀerent individual wealth levels.
2agents, the heterogeneous expectations aggregate supply equation conditions on cur-
rent expectations of both future and contemporaneous endogenous state variables.
These diﬀerences imply that the incorporation of heterogeneous expectations into a
New Keynesian model has strong implications for the equilibrium dynamics. Indeed,
by way of an example, we show that if expectations are a weighted average of rational
and adaptive expectations, then even a small degree of heterogeneity can render a
determinate model indeterminate.
The primary theoretical result of this paper demonstrates that a micro-founded
New Keynesian model with nominal rigidities and heterogeneous expectations aggre-
gates into a tractable reduced form model that can be used to study the conduct of
monetary policy. We show that the dynamic properties of New Keynesian models are
sensitive to the distribution of heterogeneity. Our application to the design of mon-
etary policy, and its impact on the equilibrium determinacy properties of the model,
provides a simple illustration of the importance of heterogeneous expectations.
That deviations from the canonical New Keynesian model can alter the equilib-
rium properties of the economy has been documented elsewhere. For example, in
a New Keynesian model with capital, (local) indeterminacy may result (Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2005)), or possibly global multiple equilibria even when the model is lo-
cally determinate (Benhabib and Eusepi (2005)). If nominal interest rates face a zero
lower bound, Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001, 2002) show that monetary
policy set to achieve a locally determinate steady state may have multiple bounded
equilibria and may even converge to an indeterminate steady state. Bullard and Mi-
tra (2002), Evans and Honkapohja (2003a,b), and Preston (2006) show that, under
adaptive learning, the unique REE may not be stable for some policy rules.
This paper also relates to a growing interest by economists in turning to hetero-
geneous agent economies in order to bring macroeconomic models into closer contact
with observed empirical regularities: see, for example, Aiyagari (1994, 1995), Con-
stantinides and Duﬃe (1996), Krebs (2003), Krusell and Smith (1998) and Krueger
and Lustig (2006). In these models, agents face uninsurable idiosyncratic risk but all
have rational expectations. In our framework, agents are able to share risk eﬃciently,
but they hold heterogeneous expectations.
Our approach generalizes Woodford (2003) to incorporate heterogeneous expecta-
tions in such a manner that the principal distinction in the reduced form IS and AS
relations between approaches is the speciﬁcation of the expectations operator. This
incorporation does require some care since the usual New Keynesian model already
has heterogeneity due to the Calvo pricing mechanism. To identify individual agents’
consumption index with aggregate income, the standard treatment assumes complete
asset markets, which allow agents to hedge the risks associated with the Calvo lottery.
However, complete ﬁnancial markets and heterogeneous expectations (or asymmetric
information) are often thought to be logically inconsistent because the prices in these
3markets should reveal the relevant information. To avoid this (potential) complica-
tion, we assume the existence of a benevolent insurance planner, who takes insurance
premiums optimally from each type of consumer and then returns the proceeds to
the agents, in order to provide agents the means to hedge Calvo related risk. This
highly stylized setting is designed to remain as close as possible, in reduced form, to
the standard model, by preserving some semblance of a representative agent. The
model in this paper, then, should be seen as a lower bound on the implications of
heterogeneity.3
We also provide a concrete example – to illustrate potential applications – in
which a proportion of agents are rational and the remaining form their expectations
adaptively. We ﬁnd that the impact of increasing the proportion of adaptive agents
depends critically on how the adaptive predictor weighs past data. If past data is
discounted, then heterogeneity may be stabilizing in the sense that policy rules that
result in indeterminacy under full rationality may yield determinacy when even a small
proportion of agents are adaptive. On the other hand, if agents place greater weight
on past data, then heterogeneity may be destabilizing in an analogous sense: policy
rules yielding determinacy under rational expectations may produce indeterminacy if
even a small proportion of agents are adaptive.
The heterogeneous expectations framework facilitates a generalization of the man-
ner in which policy aﬀects private-sector expectations. Importantly, monetary policy
inﬂuences expectations of current and future policy decisions. The conduct of sound
policy depends on the distribution of heterogeneity since heterogeneous expectations
can alter the way in which expectations propagate shocks. This reasoning ties in
with policymakers’ frequently stated priority to prevent inﬂation expectations from
becoming unhinged (e.g. Bernanke (2004)). In the current framework, how aggressive
monetary policy needs to be in responding to inﬂation depends on the distribution
of heterogeneity and how strongly boundedly rational agents respond to past data.
This channel is missing from the standard R.E. model.
One advantage to the approach presented here is that the reduced form nests
both the standard model and a heterogeneous expectations version, where the het-
erogeneity is in line with documented survey evidence. Our approach is deliberately
general in order to illustrate the ﬂexibility and because the actual distribution of
heterogeneity is an open empirical question. The purpose of this paper is to present
a coherent theory and to illustrate its potential importance. The extent to which a
heterogeneous expectations model can account for historical time-series is a topic of
current research and beyond the scope of the present paper.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 generalizes the New Keynesian
model to include heterogeneous expectations. Section 3 presents an example with an
3We envision that a more realistic modeling of the insurance market will have distinct implica-
tions. We leave such an approach to future work.
4explicit speciﬁcation of heterogeneity to facilitate analysis of the model’s equilibrium
properties. Section 4 concludes.
2 Foundations with Heterogeneous Expectations
This section develops a version of the New Keynesian model extended to include two
types of agents who are identical except with respect to the method used to form
expectations. We specify the model to remain as close as possible to the standard
model with rational expectations, and still allow for aggregation across heterogeneous
agents. Our primary ﬁnding is an aggregation result: we derive log-linearized IS and
AS relations that depend on a convex combination of heterogeneous expectations
operators. To ease exposition, we assume a purely forward-looking speciﬁcation of the
model, though it would be straightforward to extend our methodology to a version
of the model that incorporates habit persistence and partial price indexation (e.g.
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)).
2.1 Heterogeneous Expectations
Following Woodford (2003) there is a continuum of private agents indexed by i ∈ [0,1].
These agents are yeoman farmers with linear production functions Y i = Ni, where
agent i produces good i by supplying labor Ni. Agents maximize the expected value
of discounted utility ﬂow, but instead of assuming that agents form expectations
rationally, we allow for more general expectations operators. We assume that a
proportion α of agents forecast future variables using the expectations operator E1
and the remaining agents use E2, and for simplicity, we assume an agent producing
good i ∈ [0,α] uses E1 and an agent producing good j ∈ (α,1] uses E2. This
paper develops a framework in which equilibrium inﬂation and output depend on a
heterogeneous expectations operator ˆ Et that is a linear combination of E1,E2 : ˆ E =
αE1 + (1 − α)E2.
Our view of expectation formation is inﬂuenced, in part, by the adaptive learning
literature (e.g. Marcet and Sargent (1989), Evans and Honkapohja (2001)). In this
literature, fully rational expectations are replaced by linear forecasting rules whose
parameters are updated by recursive least squares. We also envision agents engaged
in economic forecasting while recognizing there may exist heterogeneity in forecast-
ing rules. Some examples of heterogeneity consistent with our framework include the
following: some agents may be rational while others adaptive, as evidence was pre-
sented by Branch (2004); agents may have diﬀerent information sets (e.g. Mankiw,
Reis, and Wolfers (2003)); or, they may use structurally diﬀerent learning rules as in
Honkapohja and Mitra (2005). Our goal is to extend this notion of agents as fore-
casters to the agents’ primitive problem and to characterize a set of admissible beliefs
5that facilitates aggregation into heterogeneous expectations IS and AS relations.
Our characterization of the types of admissible beliefs arises through several as-
sumptions we make regarding Eτ
t , the (subjective) expectations operator. These
assumptions are intended to make the model analytically tractable while insisting
upon some notion of reasonable agent behavior. We assume
A1. If x is a variable forecasted by agents and has steady state ¯ x then E1¯ x = E2¯ x =
¯ x.
A2. If x, y, x + y and αx are variables forecasted by agents then Eτ
t (x + y) =
Eτ
t (x) + Eτ
t (y) and Eτ
t (αx) = αEτ
t (x).
A3. If for all k, xt+k and
P
k βt+kxt+k are forecasted by agents then
E
τ
t
 
X
k
β
t+kxt+k
!
=
X
k
β
t+kE
τ
t (xt+k).
A4. Eτ
t satisﬁes the law of iterated expectations (L.I.E.): If x is a variable forecasted
by agents at time t and time t + k then Eτ
t ◦ Eτ
t+k(x) = Eτ
t (x).
A5. If x is a variable forecasted by agents at time t and time t+k then Eτ
t Eτ′
t+k(xt+k) =
Eτ
t xt+k, τ′  = τ.
These assumptions serve two purposes: they impose logical consistency on the ex-
pectations operator and aid in aggregation. The following brief discussion of each
assumption is useful. Assumption A1 requires some continuity in beliefs in the sense
that, in a steady state, agents’ beliefs will coincide. Assumptions A2 and A3 require
expectations to possess some linearity properties. Essentially, linear expectations
require agents to incorporate some economic structure into their forecasting model
rather than, say, mechanically applying a lag operator to every random variable.
Assumptions A4 and A5 restrict agents’ expectations so that they satisfy the law
of iterated expectations at both an individual and aggregate level. The L.I.E. at the
individual level is a reasonable and intuitive assumption: agents should not expect
to systematically change their expectations. Assumption A5 is more subtle and is
necessary so that aggregate expectations satisfy the law of iterated expectations.
The assumption of L.I.E. at the aggregate level is not without consequence, however:
A5 requires that an agent of type τ’s expectation of the future expectations of agents
of type τ′ is τ’s expectation of that future variable. This assumes away higher-
order beliefs of boundedly rational agents. There is a wide literature that studies
the implications of higher-order beliefs in monetary models (e.g. Woodford (2002),
Amato and Shin (2006)). This paper abstracts from the complications associated
with higher order beliefs by appealing to bounded rationality. Higher order beliefs
may be important in some settings and we leave further study of this issue to future
research.
62.2 Households
Agents have instantaneous utility functions given by u
￿
Ci
t,
Mi
t
Pt
￿
−v (Ni
t), where U is
separable and Ci,P are the CES aggregators
C
i =
￿Z
C
i(j)
θ−1
θ dj
￿ θ
θ−1
and P =
￿Z
P(j)
1−θdj
￿ 1
1−θ
. (1)
Agents choose sequences for consumption, money holdings, labor, and goods prices
to maximize expected discounted utility subject to a ﬂow constraint. However, as is
standard in the bounded rationality and learning literature, agents do not necessarily
observe current values of endogenous variables when making decisions: it may be
that Eτ
t xt  = xt. Quite naturally, we do assume that current values of an individual
agent’s own choice variables are known. Putting these assumptions together we ﬁnd
that when making optimal decisions, agent i, using expectations operator Eτ, faces
a perceived nominal ﬂow constraint as given by
C
i
tE
τ
t Pt + M
i
t + B
i
t + Ipt = P
i
tY
i
t + (1 + it−1)B
i
t−1 + M
i
t−1 + Irt, (2)
where P i is the price set by agent i, Y i is the quantity of goods produced by agent i,
Mi is the money held by agent i, Bi are the bonds held by agent i, and Ip and Ir are
nominal payments to and receipts from an insurance agency respectively, which the
agent takes as given. The behavior of the insurance agency will be discussed in more
detail below. Finally, the agent faces the additional constraints that the pair (Y i
t ,P i
t)
be chosen to lie on the relevant demand curve, and that changing prices P i
t is possible
with probability 1 − γ, determined according to the Calvo lottery as is standard in
New Keynesian models.
Under rationality, the theory of dynamic programing implies that agents will
choose consumption bundles to satisfy an intertemporal Euler equation of the form
uc(C
i
t) = β(1 + it)E
i
t
￿
Pt
Pt+1
￿
uc
￿
C
i
t+1
￿
, (3)
as well as an associated transversality condition,
lim
k→∞
E
i
tβ
t+kuC(C
i
t+k)
Bi
t+k
Pt+k
≤ 0. (4)
For general subjective expectations Ei
t it is not obvious that these conditions are nec-
essary or suﬃcient for a consumption sequence to be optimal: the theory of dynamic
programming and the principle of optimality were developed in stochastic environ-
ments assuming Ei
t are conditional expectations, and in the present setting, it is not
clear that the relevant theorems apply. Instead, we take as a primitive behavioral
assumption that those agents with subjective (non-rational) expectations choose a
7household plan that satisﬁes the Euler equations, and we require that along any
equilibrium path, the associated transversality condition is satisﬁed.
The justiﬁcation for these assumptions is straightforward: agents behave in a way
to equate their expected marginal rate of substitution with the expected marginal rate
of transformation, and so that they do not plan to accumulate valuable assets faster
than they are discounted. We note that these assumptions, while usually implicit, are
standard in the learning literature: see for example (Bullard and Mitra, 2002) and
(Honkapohja and Evans, 2003). Indeed, it is hard to imagine settings where it would
be reasonable to model agents as violating either type of condition. Additionally, we
assume for simplicity that it is known to agents at time t by having the central bank
announce its policy. Note that by separability of U, Uc is independent of real money
balances.
Preston (2006) presents an interesting alternative approach, in a representative
agent environment, where the agents’ optimal plans also respect their perceived life-
time intertemporal budget constraint. Preston demonstrates that if subjective ex-
pectations satisfy the law of iterated expectations, then it is possible to represent
the optimal plan as the solution to an Euler equation for appropriately deﬁned ex-
pectations. For simplicity, we follow much of the learning literature and adopt the
approach outlined in the previous paragraph, in which the Euler equations are as-
sumed to hold for all t, and the transversality condition (and hence satisfaction of the
lifetime budget constraint) is imposed ex-post. Explicitly incorporating long-horizon
expectations into the model is the next step and is a topic of current research.
We follow Woodford (2003) in assuming the cashless limit case: the utility function
is such that each household holds an arbitrarily small amount of real-money so that
the central bank can eﬀectively choose a target level for the interest rate and, although
the real-money demand function dictates the size of open market operations consistent
with that target, the actual eﬀect of these operations on the net supply of bonds is
negligible. In the current environment, the money-demand equation is given by
uM(Ci
t,Mi
t/Pt)
uC(Ci
t,Mi
t/Pt)
=
it
1 + it
. (5)
Notice as well that the expression for money demand (5) does not depend explicitly
on agents’ expectations.4
We adopt the Calvo pricing structure, where with a positive probability each
farmer’s price may remain ﬁxed. Acting as price setters, individual agents face the risk
associated with this Calvo lottery.5 The standard treatment allows agents to hedge
4In incomplete market settings it may depend on the distribution of agents’ wealth holdings (e.g.
Krusell and Smith (1998), Aiyagari (1994, 1995)). Our modeling of risk-sharing below makes wealth
holdings a fraction of the real-income of their type cohort.
5For the purposes of this paper, we abstract from modeling aggregate risk.
8against this risk by assuming the presence of complete markets; in this way, agents
are able to guarantee themselves the average real income each period. Our model
posits two types of agents. While each type will face an equal probability of being
allowed to change prices, their expected real income diﬀers due to heterogeneity of
expectations. Because of this, deriving from micro-foundations a reduced form similar
to the rational expectations case requires some care. For example, the derivation of
the IS relation, which is obtained by log-linearizing the agents’ consumption Euler
equation, requires agents of a given type form expectations of their own consumption
index, and the value of this index may diﬀer from the index value of other types of
agents; it is not immediate that aggregation across types, which is needed to obtain
the model’s reduced form equations, is possible in this case.
To address this issue, we assume the presence of a benevolent ﬁnancial regulator
who takes insurance premiums optimally from each type of consumer and then returns
the proceeds in order to provide agents the means to hedge the risk associated to the
Calvo lottery. The planner collects all income and then redistributes to each type of
agent the average income of that agent’s type. The planner does this so that each
agent type, as indexed by their expectation formation mechanism, is fully insured
against the risk associated to the possibility that they will not be tapped to adjust
prices; in this way agents are able to guarantee themselves within type average real
income.6
As an alternative there is a long history of studying heterogeneity in dynamic mod-
els with incomplete ﬁnancial markets. In many cases, the existence of heterogeneous
consumers and incomplete markets imply that equilibrium prices and allocations dif-
fer from the representative agent model, but the quantitative diﬀerences seem small
(Krusell and Smith (1998)). In our setting, heterogeneity arises because agents use
diﬀerent expectations operators when solving for their optimal plans, thus their opti-
mal allocations could be diﬀerent. This highly stylized setting is designed to remain
close, in reduced form, to the standard model. We thus view our model as a lower
bound on the implications of heterogeneity.
Preston (2005, 2006) develops a micro-founded model with arbitrary subjective
expectations and incomplete ﬁnancial markets. In his formulation, agents engage in
risk-sharing through labor markets and ﬁrm proﬁt sharing. Importantly, in Preston’s
approach agents must respect their intertemporal budget constraint implying that
long-horizon expectations matter: solutions to the Euler equation do not necessarily
characterize optimal plans with subjective expectations. In our model, markets are
also incomplete and, as an alternative to the use of an insurance planner, we could
follow Preston, in which case long horizon expectations would matter. We expect
distinct results with the long-horizon approach developed by Preston, and further,
6Our approach is similar to Kocherlakota (1996) except we assume there are no commitment
issues, on either side, and this essentially creates two types of representative agents. This risk-
sharing mechanism is also employed by Shi (1999) and Mankiw and Reis (2006).
9we anticipate that with a fraction of rational and a fraction of long-horizon agents
the instability results below will be maintained or strengthened.
Under our ﬁnancial structure, agents of type τ may guarantee themselves a real
income Ωτ as given by
Ω
1 =
1
αP
Z α
0
P(i)Y (i)di and Ω
2 =
1
(1 − α)P
Z 1
α
P(i)Y (i)di. (6)
Notice that
P(αΩ
1 + (1 − α)Ω
2) =
Z
P(i)Y (i)di = PY,
from which it follows that Y = αΩ1 + (1 − α)Ω2.
In equilibrium, if agent i is of type τ then, Ii
rt = PtΩτ
t and Ii
pt = P i
tY i
t . Therefore,
in equilibrium,
C
i
t + b
i
t =
￿
1 + it−1
1 + πt
￿
b
i
t−1 + Ω
τ
t, (7)
where bi is the quantity of real bonds held by agent i, and 1 + πt = Pt/Pt−1. A ﬁrst
order expansion of (7) around steady state, incorporating A1, yields
C
i
t − ¯ C
i + b
i
t =
￿
1 +¯ i
1 + ¯ π
￿
b
i
t−1 + Ω
τ
t − ¯ Ω
τ,
where we have exploited ¯ bi = 0. Using β(1 +¯ i) = 1 and ¯ Ci = ¯ Ωτ = ¯ Y , we obtain the
log-linear approximation
c
i
t = ˆ Ω
τ
t ≡ ω
τ
t + β
−1bi
t−1
¯ Y
−
bi
t
¯ Y
, (8)
where c and ω are in log deviations from steady-state form, c = log(Ci/¯ Y ),ω =
log(Ωτ/¯ Ωτ).
To obtain a New Keynesian IS relation, we log-linearize (3):
c
i
t = E
i
tc
i
t+1 − σ
−1 ￿
it − E
i
tπt+1
￿
. (9)
We note that Ei
tπt+1 = Ei
t(logPt+1 − logPt) = Ei
t logPt+1 − Ei
t logPt, and may not
be equal to Ei
t(logPt+1) − logPt, in the event Pt is not observable.
Inserting (8) into (9) yields the equation
ˆ Ω
τ
t = E
τ
t ˆ Ω
τ
t+1 − σ
−1(it − E
τ
t πt+1). (10)
Note that along any equilibrium path, equation (10) must be satisﬁed for both agent
types. The IS curve comes from aggregating this equation across all households. Iter-
ate this equation forward, while employing the assumptions on agents’ expectations,
to obtain
ˆ Ω
τ
t = ˆ Ω
τ
∞ − σ
−1E
τ
t
X
k≥0
(it+k − πt+k+1), (11)
10where ˆ Ωτ
∞ = limk→∞ Eτ
t ˆ Ωτ
t+k.7 Noting that bond market clearing requires αb1
t =
−(1 − α)b2
t, we get that
αˆ Ω
1
t + (1 − α)ˆ Ω
2
t = yt.
Then
yt = αˆ Ω
1
t + (1 − α)ˆ Ω
2
t
= αˆ Ω
1
∞ + (1 − α)ˆ Ω
2
∞ − σ
−1 ˆ Et
X
k≥0
(it+k − πt+k+1)
= ˆ Etyt+1 − σ
−1
￿
it − ˆ Etπt+1
￿
+αˆ Ω
1
∞ + (1 − α)ˆ Ω
2
∞ − ˆ Et
￿
αˆ Ω
1
∞ + (1 − α)ˆ Ω
2
∞
￿
,
where ˆ E = αE1 + (1 − α)E2. Here we note that the ﬁnal equality makes use of the
law of iterated expectations at the aggregate level: see assumption (A5).
To obtain an IS form most similar to the homogeneous expectations case, we
make the additional assumption that all agents predict limiting wealth in an identical
manner:
A6. All agents have common expectations on expected diﬀerences in limiting wealth:
αˆ Ω
1
∞ + (1 − α)ˆ Ω
2
∞ − ˆ Et
￿
αˆ Ω
1
∞ + (1 − α)ˆ Ω
2
∞
￿
= 0.
Assumption (A6) can be written equivalently as ˆ Ωj
∞ = Ej′ˆ Ωj
∞,j′  = j. While this is
plausible, and is satisﬁed when agents have rational expectations regarding limiting
wealth, one might envision agents holding beliefs that violate it. In that case, the
distribution of wealth dynamics will aﬀect equilibrium allocations. Such an analysis is
beyond the scope of the present paper but is an interesting topic for further research.
The above analysis provides the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If agents’ expectations E1 and E2 satisfy assumptions (A1)-(A6)
then, up to a log-linear approximation, equilibrium output and inﬂation satisfy the
following IS relation
yt = ˆ Etyt+1 − σ
−1
￿
it − ˆ Etπt+1
￿
(12)
where ˆ E = αE1 + (1 − α)E2.
From this we conclude that with heterogeneous expectations the IS equation is the
usual IS curve where conditional expectations are replaced with a convex combination
of the heterogeneous expectations operators.
7We take ˆ Ωτ
∞, which is the time t expected limiting value of log consumption, to be ﬁnite and
independent of time.
112.3 Optimal Pricing
To determine the equilibrium behavior of inﬂation we turn to the agents’ pricing
problem. We ﬁrst compute demand for a particular good: the CES aggregate con-
sumption index implies that demand by an agent of type τ for good i, is given
by (Pi/P)
−θ ￿
Ωτ + (1 + i−1)Bτ
−1/P − Bτ/P
￿
. Aggregating across type and imposing
bond market clearing yields
Y
i = α(Pi/P)
−θ Ω
1 + (1 − α)(Pi/P)
−θ Ω
2 = (Pi/P)
−θ Y
as usual.
Note that because of the presence of the insurance company, an agent’s income is,
in eﬀect, independent of his eﬀort; because of this, an agent’s optimal output Y i is
zero. To avoid this free-rider problem, we assume that private agents are contracted
to choose price and output as if they faced their perceived constraint (2), and we
further assume that these contracts are fully enforceable. In some sense, this requires
the agent to behave as if they will receive their full marginal revenue from producing
more.8 With this assumption, we may proceed as follows: Let agent i be of type
τ. Use the perceived budget constraint to write Ci
t+k = Ci
t+k(P i
t), in the event that
agent i can not change prices for k periods. Then P i
t is chosen by contract to solve
maxE
τ
t
X
k≥0
(βγ)
k
h
u(C
i
t+k(P
i
t), ) − v
￿￿
P
i
t/Pt+k
￿−θ Yt+k
￿i
. (13)
As above, because expectations are not necessarily rational, we assume rather than
infer that agents behave in a manner consistent with the usual ﬁrst order conditions
of this pricing problem. This FOC may be log-linearized as usual, but now there is
the presence of both Y and Ci. Passing expectations across choice variables (so that
ˆ Ωτ
t and not Eτ
t ˆ Ωτ
t enters the equation) and imposing equilibrium yields
E
τ
t
X
k≥0
(γβ)
k
￿
log
￿
P
i
t
￿
− log(Pt+k) − ζ1ˆ Ω
τ
t+k − ζ2yt+k
￿
= 0.
Subtract Eτ
t logPt from each side and solve for logP i
t − Eτ
t logPt. We obtain9
logP
i
t − E
τ
t logPt = E
τ
t
X
k≥0
(γβ)
k
￿
γβπt+k+1 + (1 − γβ)(ζ1ˆ Ω
τ
t+k + ζ2yt+k)
￿
.
8One could equivalently imagine a household where one member consumes given the insurance
payment and the other works and makes optimal pricing decisions.
9This step requires the following observation: Let st =
Pt
k=1 πk = logPt−logP0, and set s0 = 0.
Then
(1 − δ)
X
t≥0
δt(logPt − logP0) =
X
t≥0
δtst −
X
t≥0
δt+1st =
X
t≥0
δtπt+1.
12Stepping this equation forward, applying the L.I.E., using the linearity assumption
(A2) and rearranging yields
logP
i
t −E
τ
t logPt = γβE
τ
t πt+1+(1−γβ)
￿
ζ1ˆ Ω
τ
t + ζ2E
τ
t yt
￿
+γβE
τ
t logP
i
t+1/Pt+1. (14)
We turn now to the evolution of aggregate prices. The pricing decision is homoge-
neous within type, so we now say P τ
t is the optimal price chosen by an agent of type
τ in time t, and P τ
t (j) denotes the price set by ﬁrm j (of type τ) in time t. Then
(Pt)
1−θ =
Z α
0
P
1
t (j)
1−θdj +
Z 1
α
P
2
t (j)
1−θdj.
The proportion 1 − γ of each type changes their optimal price in period t. Thus
Z α
0
P
1
t (j)
1−θdj = (1 − γ)α
￿
P
1
t
￿1−θ + γ
Z α
0
P
1
t−1(j)
1−θdj,
and similarly for
R 1
α P 2
t (j)1−θdj. We obtain
(Pt)
1−θ = (1 − γ)α
￿
P
1
t
￿1−θ + (1 − γ)(1 − α)
￿
P
2
t
￿1−θ + γ (Pt−1)
1−θ .
Log linearization yields
pt = (1 − γ)αp
1
t + (1 − γ)(1 − α)p
2
t + γpt−1,
so that, subtracting (1 − γ)pt from both sides, we have
αlogP
1
t /Pt + (1 − α)logP
2
t /Pt =
γ
1 − γ
πt.
Finally, multiply equation (14) by α for τ = 1 and by 1−α for τ = 2 and add to get
the following result:
Proposition 2 If agents’ expectations E1 and E2 satisfy assumptions (A1)-(A6)
then, up to a log-linear approximation, equilibrium output and inﬂation satisﬁes the
AS relation
πt = β ˆ Etπt+1 + λ1yt + λ2 ˆ Etyt +
1 − γ
γ
( ˆ Etπt − πt). (15)
where ˆ E = αE1 + (1 − α)E2.
Here λ = λ1 +λ2 is the usual coeﬃcient on output gap in the new Keynesian Phillips
curve. Notice that if all agents are rational, so that ˆ Et = Et, this curve reduces to
the usual AS equation.
13It is worth remarking on an important diﬀerence between (15) and the usual New
Keynesian expectational Phillips curve. Equation (15) includes two terms that in-
corporate current expectations of the current state variables, ˆ Etyt, ˆ Etπt. These terms
arise because of the natural timing assumptions for boundedly rational agents. We
assumed, as is standard in the adaptive learning literature, that boundedly rational
agents observe current exogenous variables but contemporaneous endogenous state
variables are unobserved. In price-setting this implies that agents do not see the
aggregate price when they set their own price, and similarly for observing aggregate
output. This assumption is often employed for adaptive agents to avoid simultaneity
in beliefs and outcomes that, while natural in a rational expectations equilibrium,
seems less plausible for boundedly rational agents. If these state variables were ob-
served then the ﬁnal term in (15) would reduce to zero and λ1yt + λ2 ˆ Etyt = λyt, and
we would have a heterogeneous expectations Phillips curve with the same reduced
form as under RE. We anticipate that the form of (15) may have implications for an
estimated version of the model and any potential empirical implications are the topic
of future research.
2.4 Heterogeneous Expectations Equilibria
The aggregate dynamics of our model are given by
yt = ˆ Etyt+1 − σ
−1
￿
it − ˆ Etπt+1
￿
πt = β ˆ Etπt+1 + λ1yt + λ2 ˆ Etyt +
1 − γ
γ
( ˆ Etπt − πt),
and it is tempting to think that, given a policy process it, an output gap and inﬂation
process yt,πt satisfying the above system constitutes an equilibrium to our model;
however, we must proceed with care to ensure that all of the assumptions regarding
optimal agent behavior are respected. The deﬁnition of equilibrium must include the
restriction that ˆ Ωτ
t satisﬁes the Euler equation (10) for each agent type τ, and that
the transversality condition of each agent type is respected. At the current level of
generality, little more can be said about the nature of the model’s equilibrium; but we
will return to these issues in Section 3 below where, for our application to monetary
policy and determinacy, we explicitly deﬁne the expectations operators.
2.5 Further Discussion
The above analysis constructed a New Keynesian model with heterogeneous expec-
tations. We demonstrated that, under reasonable assumptions on expectations, indi-
vidual decision rules aggregate into heterogeneous expectations IS and AS relations.
14Interestingly, the heterogeneous expectations Phillips curve incorporates current ex-
pectations of contemporaneous output and inﬂation. These terms arise if some agents
form decisions based on forecasts of contemporaneous endogenous state variables.
These aggregation results are new and are the primary contribution of this paper.
This subsection discusses at greater length some of the assumptions required for ag-
gregation.
The aggregation results, captured in Propositions 1 and 2, rely heavily on the
law of iterated expectations, both at the individual level (assumption (A4)) and at
the aggregate level (assumption (A5)), and some discussion of the application of
this law is warranted. For clarity, we impose the law of iterated expectations as an
axiom. It is, however, a consequence of consistent behavior on the part of agents: we
imagine expectations of a given agent as corresponding to subjective probabilities of
future events, and, because of this correspondence, the law of iterated expectations
holds by deﬁnition. Indeed, it is always possible to invent the required subjective
probability distribution that rationalizes a forecasting rule. Even if agents maximize
utility subject to an incorrect subjective probability distribution, their beliefs still
satisfy the L.I.E. with respect to this distribution.
One can construct beliefs that satisfy the law of iterated expectations by building
forecasting models recursively by forward iteration, so that the law of iterated expec-
tations holds by construction. This is the standard assumption in the literature on
learning in which expectations of future variables are based on forward iteration of
the agents’ perceived laws of motion: see for example, (Bullard and Mitra, 2002) and
(Evans and Honkapohja, 2003). Also, it is precisely this construction that we adopt
in the next section when imposing adaptive expectations on a proportion of agents.
While we contend that the law of iterated expectations is a deﬁning property of
expectation formation, other assumptions were made primarily for simplicity. For
example, our risk-sharing arrangements were made to identify consumption with ex-
pected within-type wealth net bond holdings. It would be interesting for future
research to study the insurance markets and incomplete ﬁnancial markets in greater
detail and to examine the wealth distribution eﬀects on aggregate variables arising
from heterogeneous expectations. Along these same lines, assumption (A6), regarding
expected limiting wealth, also simpliﬁes the analysis and eases aggregation. We think
that if we were to model the wealth distribution directly there would be even starker
diﬀerences from the standard rational expectations model. For these reasons, one
interpretation of our results is that a model with heterogeneous expectations could
lead to important diﬀerences from a representative agent model.
153 An Application to Monetary Policy
Propositions 1 and 2 constitute a New-Keynesian laboratory in which the impact of
expectations heterogeneity on equilibrium outcomes can be studied and compared to
their rational expectations counterparts. In this section we provide one example of
our model’s potential for providing new and interesting results by examining its deter-
minacy properties. We anticipate that there are other applications of our framework.
Particularly, as alluded to in the introduction, when optimal policy is viewed as a
management of expectations, one might expect that the precise form of an optimal
policy rule will hinge on the distribution of heterogeneity. Such an analysis is beyond
the scope of the present paper. Instead we provide an example that demonstrates the
potential for heterogeneity to alter the dynamic properties of the economy.
Our focus will be on equilibrium determinacy. A linear rational expectations
model is said to be determinate if there is a unique non-explosive equilibrium, inde-
terminate if there are many non-explosive equilibria, and explosive otherwise, and we
simply extend these deﬁnitions to the model with heterogeneous expectations.10 That
New Keynesian models, when closed with Taylor-type instrument rules, may exhibit
indeterminacy has been noted by a number of authors: see, for example, Bernanke and
Woodford (1997), Woodford (1999) and Svensson and Woodford (2003). Indetermi-
nacy is thought to be undesirable because of the presence of multiple equilibria, many
of which may be welfare reducing. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) have suggested
that the volatile nature of the US time-series in the 1970s can, in part, be explained
by the presence of sunspot equilibria. Further empirical evidence is provided by Lubik
and Schorfheide (2005).
In a univariate reduced form model having the same structure as the heteroge-
neous NK model – see (21) below – Branch and McGough (2005) found that the
presence of adaptive agents impacts the determinacy properties of the model. For
some parameterizations, the presence of adaptive agents may be stabilizing in the
sense that a model that is indeterminate under the assumption of uniform rational-
ity may be determinate when some agents form their expectations adaptively. The
converse also holds: for some parameterizations even if only a very small proportion
of agents are adaptive, an otherwise determinate model may be indeterminate.
The importance from a policy perspective of understanding a monetary model’s
determinacy properties, together with the possibility demonstrated by Branch and
McGough (2005) that the presence of adaptive agents can impact determinacy, mo-
tivates our analysis of the determinacy properties of the New Keynesian model with
heterogeneous expectations. The presence of heterogeneous agents raises an obvious
question: how are the determinacy properties of a such a model computed? This
10Non-explosive equilibria are the focus of rational expectations model because explosive time
series typically violate transversality.
16question was answered in Branch and McGough (2005): speciﬁcally, given a mone-
tary policy {it}, and a pair of expectations operators (E1,E2), solutions to (12), (15)
are what Branch and McGough (2005) deﬁne as Heterogeneous Expectations Equilib-
ria. In this earlier paper, we showed that any model with heterogeneous expectations
of a particular form can be re-written in terms of an associated rational expectations
model, bringing to bear the standard rational expectations toolkit to analyze the
number and nature of heterogeneous expectations equilibria. In this way, the analy-
sis of determinacy in our model reduces to the well-understood determinacy analysis
of the associated rational expectations model.
Before analyzing determinacy, we close the heterogeneous expectations New Key-
nesian model by specifying a monetary policy rule and a precise form for private
agents’ expectations. We turn to these tasks in the following two subsections.
3.1 Monetary Policy
The central bank is assumed to use a forward-looking Taylor rule to set interest rates:
PR1 : it = αyEtyt+1 + απEtπt+1, (16)
where expectations here are taken to be rational. This expectations based policy rule
has been studied by Bullard and Mitra (2002), Evans and Honkapohja (2003a,b),
Evans and McGough (2005a,b), and Preston (2005). It has the advantage of condi-
tioning on observables, and thus addresses the concern of McCallum that contempo-
raneous policy rules are not realistic in practice; and it imposes that policy-makers
set their instrument conditional on their best forecasts of future inﬂation and output
gap (e.g. Svensson and Woodford (2003)): in this way, policy makers can account for
the lag between a policy’s implementation and its impact.
We adopt (16) as our benchmark policy rule; however, we also consider the fol-
lowing speciﬁcation of the policy rule:
PR2 : it = αy ˆ Etyt+1 + απ ˆ Etπt+1. (17)
Here, policy makers react to private agents expectations rather than to optimal fore-
casts; this is consistent with the view that policy-makers set policy to anchor agents’
expectations. In particular, Bernanke (2004) advocates policy that reacts aggressively
to private-sector expectations, particularly when they are non-rational. Evans and
Honkapohja (2003) show that such a rule may have good properties in the presence
of boundedly rational agents.
3.2 Rational versus Adaptive Expectations
In order to present precise results concerning our model’s determinacy properties,
we must make assumptions on ˆ Et. For simplicity, we focus on rational versus simple
17adaptive expectations. More speciﬁcally, we make the following assumption on beliefs:
agents of type 1 are rational and agents of type 2 are adaptive on output and inﬂation:
thus for x = y or π,
E
2
t(xt) = θxxt−1,
and, as is standard in the learning literature, E2
txt+k is constructed iteratively. Hav-
ing deﬁned adaptive expectations on xt+k, we impose that the operator satisfy the
assumptions (A1)-(A6). Note that from our construction, adaptive expectations sat-
isﬁes the L.I.E. However, somewhat more subtly, rational agents are not “hyper-
rational” in the following sense: hyper-rationality would imply that E1
tE2
t+1xt+1 =
θxxt; however, assumption (A5) requires that E1
tE2
t+1xt+1 = E1
txt+1.11
Using (A5) we obtain
ˆ Etxt = nxxt + (1 − nx)θxxt−1
ˆ Et(xt+1) = nxEtxt+1 + (1 − nx)θ
2
xxt−1.
Here nx is the proportion of agents having rational expectations. The operator E2
t is
a form of adaptive (θ < 1) or extrapolative (θ > 1) expectations (for simplicity, below
we refer to E2 as an “adaptive” expectations operator, even in the event θ > 1). Such
expectations can be thought of as arising from a simple linear perceived law of motion
xt = θxt−1. Under certain conditions, including the assumption of homogeneous
expectations, it is possible for real-time estimates of θ to converge to their REE
value. In this paper, we take the value of θ as given and leave to future research the
study of stability under learning of heterogeneous expectations equilibria.12 We do,
however, let the fraction of rational agents and the adaptive parameter θ diﬀer by
forecasting variable.
Adaptive expectations of this form have been considered by Brock and Hommes
(1997, 1998), Branch (2002), Branch and McGough (2005), and Pesaran (1987).
When θ = 1 then the operator is usually called ‘naive’ expectations, θ < 1 are
adaptive in the sense that they dampen recent observations, θ > 1 are often called
‘extrapolative’ or trend chasing expectations. The θ > 1 is given particular emphasis
by Brock and Hommes (1998).
Despite the simple form of our heterogeneous expectations operator, there is ev-
idence in survey data on inﬂation expectations that agents are distributed across
rational expectations and adaptive expectations of this form (see Branch (2004)).
The contribution of this paper, however, is to show how to incorporate heterogeneous
expectations into a monetary model and show that their presence can have signiﬁcant
implications for monetary policy. Future research should undertake serious empirical
11More carefully, our rational agents are assumed to know the conditional distributions of output
and inﬂation, but not the expectations of non-rational agents. We further assume that rational
agents are not sophisticated enough to back out the expectations of non-rational agents.
12Some progress on this issue has been made by Guse (2005) in a simple univariate framework.
18studies of heterogeneous beliefs in monetary DSGE models along the lines of Smets
and Wouters (2003), Lubik and Schorfheide (2005), or Milani (2006).
3.3 Determining Determinacy
Our fully speciﬁed aggregate model is given by
yt = ˆ Etyt+1 − σ
−1
￿
it − ˆ Etπt+1
￿
(18)
πt = β ˆ Etπt+1 + λ1yt + λ2 ˆ Etyt +
1 − γ
γ
( ˆ Etπt − πt) (19)
it = αyEtyt+1 + απEtπt+1 (20)
ˆ Etyt = nyyt + (1 − ny)θyyt−1
ˆ Et(yt+1) = nyE
1
tyt+1 + (1 − ny)θ
2
yyt−1
ˆ Etπt = nππt + (1 − nπ)θππt−1
ˆ Et(πt+1) = nπE
1
tπt+1 + (1 − nπ)θ
2
ππt−1,
together with the alternative policy rule PR2. Simpliﬁcation yields the following
reduced form model:
Fxt = BEtxt+1 + Cxt−1, (21)
for appropriate matrices F,B, and C, where det(B)  = 0 and x = (y,π)′. Equation
(21) is the rational expectations model (the ARE) associated with the heterogeneous
expectations model above. Since the ARE has the same form as a rational expec-
tations model with predetermined variables there is an established toolkit for deter-
mining determinacy, thereby making our approach easily accessible to practitioners.13
Techniques for analyzing the determinacy properties of a linear model are well-known:
see for example Blanchard and Kahn (1980).
Let
M =
￿
B−1F −B−1C
I2 0
￿
. (22)
The determinacy properties of the model depend on the magnitude of the eigenvalues
of M, which we write as λi, where i > j ⇒ |λi| ≤ |λj|.14 Note that in general there are
two predetermined variables, so that determinacy obtains when precisely two of the
eigenvalues of M are outside the unit circle: fewer eigenvalues outside the unit circle
implies indeterminacy and more implies explosiveness. As we will see in the sequel,
13As mentioned above, in rational expectations models, non-explosiveness is typically required
in order to avoid violation of asymptotic ﬁrst order conditions. Because a portion of our agents
are rational and therefore have analogous asymptotic ﬁrst order conditions, we also focus on non-
explosive equilibria: see Sub-section 3.4 below.
14Additive noise in the IS or AS relation does not impact the determinacy properties.
19the notion of indeterminacy can be reﬁned in a useful way: following Evans and
McGough (2005a), we say that if |λ1| < 1 then the model is order two indeterminate
(or, equivalently, exhibits order two indeterminacy) and if |λ1| > 1 > |λ2| we say
the model is order one indeterminate. Note that the order of the indeterminacy
corresponds to the largest possible dimension of a martingale diﬀerence sequence
that can coordinate an associated sunspot equilibrium: for a detailed discussion see
Evans and McGough (2005a). Finally, the same analysis applies in case policy rule
two is used with the only modiﬁcation being the dependence of the matrix M on the
model’s deep parameters.
3.4 Individual agents’ constraints
Analysis of the determinacy properties of the associated rational model, given by (21),
is straightforward and one can proceed by employing the usual solution techniques.
However, the heterogeneity in our model raises an additional concern: how do we
know that the aggregate time-series determined by (21) can also arise by aggregat-
ing from household plans? That is, a heterogeneous expectations equilibrium must
simultaneously solve (21) and the individual agents’ ﬁrst order conditions. Given a
solution to (21), it is always possible to back out a household plan for each individual
since aggregate output is a weighted average of consumption across types. However,
it also must be veriﬁed that, along an equilibrium path, bond holdings satisfy the
transversality condition for each agent.
The transversality condition requires that
lim
k
E
τ
t β
kuc(C
τ
t+k)b
τ
t+k ≤ 0. (23)
is satisﬁed, along an equilibrium path, at each t and for each agent type τ. We have
not yet speciﬁed explicitly how type τ = 2 “adaptive” agents forecast uc(C2
t+k)b2
t+k.
Since this is a forecast on the household side, and τ = 2 are adaptive agents, it seems
natural to assume they forecast this term via
E
2
tuc(C
2
t )b
2
t = ˆ θuc(C
2
t−1)b
2
t−1,
for some value ˆ θ, and the forecast function is constructed iteratively as before. A
priori, there is no reason to expect ˆ θ = θy = θπ. Below, we restrict attention to the
case where ˆ θ = θy. It follows that (23) is satisﬁed for adaptive agents provided that
ˆ θ < 1/β.
We also have to ensure rational agents satisfy their transversality condition. To
check this condition, ﬁrst forward iterate the Euler equation for rational agents, to
obtain
ˆ Ω
1
t = −σEt
X
(it+1 − πt+k+1). (24)
20Since it,πt are aggregate processes that, along with yt, are nonexplosive solutions to
(21), it follows that we may write it+1 − πt+k+1 = Azt+k, where zt is a nonexplosive
VAR in current and lagged output and inﬂation.15 It follows from (24) that ˆ Ω1
t is
uniformly bounded provided the aggegrate variables are uniformly bounded as well.
Next, we note that Ω1
t is non-explosive since it is smaller than Yt, which itself is
non-explosive. Then ω1
t = log(Ω1
t/¯ Ω1) is non-explosive. Since ˆ Ω1
t is non-explosive,
it follows that β−1b1
t−1 − b1
t = ˆ Ω1
t − ω1
t is non-explosive, so that bt is expected to
grow at most at a rate slower than β−1. Thus, any process for bonds supporting a
non-explosive equilibrium time series will satisfy the associated transversality condi-
tions. We conclude, therefore, that given our speciﬁcation for adaptive expectations,
a nonexplosive solution to (21) is a heterogeneous expectations equilibrium.
3.5 Numerical Analysis of Determinacy
Numerical results require assigning values to the reduced form model’s parameters, i.e.
to λ1,λ2,γ,σ, and β; also the proportions of rational agents nx and the values of the
adaptation parameters θx must be speciﬁed. These parameters could be estimated,
however, such an estimation is beyond the scope of this simple application. Instead,
we “derive” values for our parameters using estimates available in the literature; and
we test for robustness of our results to varying parameter values whenever possible.
The reduced form parameters of the usual New Keynesian model (i.e., the model
under rational expectations) are given by λ (where λ = λ1 + λ2) and σ−1. These
parameters have been estimated by a number of authors including Woodford (1999),
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and McCallum and Nelson (1999):16 see Table 1.
We use these authors’ estimate of σ−1, and set, as our benchmark, λi = λ/2.17 We
test the robustness of this latter assumption by allowing the relative sizes of the λi to
vary. There are also several estimates of γ available: we use as a benchmark γ = .65
as given by Walsh (2003), and again, test for robustness. The discount factor β is
taken to be .99.
Given reduced form parameter values, the model is closed by specifying a policy
rule (i.e. setting values for αx and απ), and choosing values for θ = (θy,θπ)′ and
n = (nx,nπ)′. To perform our analysis, we ﬁx θ and then for n∗ ∈ {1,.99,.9,.7} we
analyze the determinacy properties of models characterized by the following policy
rules: 0 < απ < 2, 0 < αx < 2. We refer to this region as the benchmark policy space.
15The notion of “nonexplosiveness” used here can be made formal in a variety of ways depending on
the type of extrinsic noise processes under consideration. For example, one can restrict attention to
covariance stationary processes, or impose the weaker restriction of conditionally uniformly bounded
processes. See Evans and McGough (2005c) for details.
16Calibrations are for quarterly data with it and πt measured as quarterly rates. The CGG
calibration (based on annualized rates) is adjusted accordingly
17It is straightforward to compute that λi > 0.
21Table 1: Calibrations
Author(s) σ−1 λ
W 1/.157 .024
CGG 4 .075
MN .164 .3
Finally, in the sequel, we will say that certain numerical results “obtain robustly.”
By this, we will mean that they obtain under the following conditions:
• For both policy rules;
• Across calibrations for benchmark γ and λi, and for speciﬁed θ and n;
• Across λ2 ∈ {.005,.012,.022}, for the W-calibration, benchmark γ, and for
speciﬁed θ and n;
• Across γ ∈ {.4,.65,.9}, for the W-calibration, benchmark λi, and for speciﬁed
θ and n.
3.5.1 Adaptive Expectations: θ < 1.
We ﬁrst consider the case where adaptive agents place less weight on past data: that
is, when θ < 1. Figure 1 presents results for the Woodford calibration under the
benchmark assumptions, with θ = .9.18 The NW panel indicates the outcome under
rationality, and is consistent with the results in Evans and McGough (2005). Much
of the parameter space corresponds to indeterminacy of both order one and order
two, with determinacy prevailing only for large απ and low αx. Now notice that as n
decreases, the region corresponding to determinacy increases in size (as a proportion
of the benchmark policy space). Thus we obtain the following result.
Result 3 If θ < 1 then policy rules corresponding to indeterminacy when n = 1 may
yield determinacy when there is even a small proportion of adaptive agents in the
economy. In this sense, the presence of adaptive agents may be stabilizing.
As indicated in the NW panel, with full rationality, indeterminacy comprises a
large portion of the parameter space. To avoid indeterminacy, the Taylor principle
instructs policy-makers to “lean against the wind,” by setting the coeﬃcient on in-
ﬂation (or expected inﬂation) in the interest rate rule larger than one. In this way, a
18For all of our examples, ny = nπ.
22Figure 1: Determinacy Properties: θ < 1.
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rise in inﬂation is met with a larger rise in the nominal rate, and through the Fisher
relation this implies a rise in the real interest rate that will have a dampening eﬀect
on the economy.
While the Taylor principle does, in many cases, render a model determinate, and
while it is wonderfully elegant and wholly intuitive, it is known in general to be
neither necessary nor suﬃcient to guarantee a unique equilibrium: Bullard and Mitra
(2002) contradict both necessity and suﬃciency in a purely forward looking New
Keynesian model; other examples include Honkapohja and Mitra (2005) and Evans
and McGough (2005a, 2005b).19
19Benhabib, Schmidt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) show that even when it does yield determinacy, a
rule satisfying the Taylor principle may by ill-advised.
23Both the Taylor principle, and the fact that it may be neither necessary nor
suﬃcient for determinacy is evident in Figure 1. The NW panel contains a steep,
negatively sloped line anchored to the horizontal axis at απ = 1. For αx = 0, this line
marks the boundary between rules that satisfy the Taylor principle and those that
do not. This panel shows that rules which satisfy the Taylor principle, but which
also set αx > ≈ .35 result in order one indeterminacy: here the Taylor principle is
not suﬃcient to prevent indeterminacy. It is also evident from the NW panel, that
for values of απ which are smaller than but very near to one, there correspond αx so
that the model is determinate, thus demonstrating that the Taylor principle is not
necessary for determinacy to obtain.
Now notice the impact of heterogeneity: as n decreases the line anchored at απ = 0
rotates counterclockwise, thereby enlarging the relative size of the determinacy region;
this rotation therefore increases the number of rules that simultaneously violate the
Taylor principle and yield determinacy. We ﬁnd that this counterclockwise rotation
of the line anchored at απ = 1 obtains robustly.
3.5.2 Extrapolative Expectations: θ > 1.
We now turn to the case where agents place greater weight on past data, i.e. θ > 1.
Here there is an additional subtlety: for non-explosive time paths of output gap
and inﬂation to correspond to optimal behavior on the part of adaptive agents, it
must be the case that ˆ θ, the parameter used by adaptive agents to forecast the
current value of future bond holdings, be less that β−1. To construct Figure 2, we
take θπ = θy = ˆ θ = β−1 − ε, for some ε > 0, and we consider a case in which
θπ  = θy = ˆ θ in Figure 3.20 Figure 2 presents results for the benchmark parameter
values. The NW panel is identical to the panel in Figure 1, but here, as n decreases,
the line anchored at απ = 1 rotates clockwise, thereby reducing the relative size of
the region in parameter space corresponding to determinacy. However, for suﬃciently
high fractions of adaptive agents (small n) the presence of heterogeneity may be
stabilizing, in accordance with Result 3. This leads us to the next result.
Result 4 If θ > 1 then policy rules that yield a determinate outcome in case of
rationality may present indeterminacy in case even a very small proportion of agents
are behaving adaptively. In this case, we ﬁnd that the presence of adaptive agents
may be destabilizing.
We ﬁnd that this clockwise rotation line anchored at απ = 1 qualitatively obtains
robustly.21
20Since ˆ θ is a forecast on the “household side” it seems natural to assume θy = ˆ θ, and it is plausible
to consider cases where θπ = θy.
21In the NE panel, there is a small unlabeled region along the horizontal axis and bounded above
by a thin, downward-sloping line. In this region order two indeterminacy obtains.
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Whether heterogeneity is stabilizing or destabilizing, for a given fraction of rational
agents, depends critically on the magnitude of the adaptation parameter θ. As an
example, consider Figure 3, in which θπ = 1.1 and θy = ˆ θ = β−1 − ε as before.
Here we are assuming that adaptive agents forecast π to grow at a faster rate than
the present value of their bond holdings. We see that signiﬁcant rotation obtains
even if as few as 1% of private agents are adaptive, and if 10% are adaptive then
indeterminacy obtains for somes rules which satisfy the Talyor principle and yield
determinacy under rationality.22 Moreover, the clockwise rotation of the determinacy
frontier expands the region of order two indeterminacy.
Results 1 and 2 suggest that whether heterogeneity stabilizes or destabilizes de-
pends on the distribution of agents across rational and adaptive expectations, and
22In the SW and SE panels, there are small unlabeled regions along the horizontal axis and
bounded above by thin, downward-sloping lines. In these regions order two indeterminacy obtains.
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how strongly agents project past data in the adaptive predictor. When agents are
adaptive in the more traditional sense, the region of determinacy may be more ex-
pansive. However, even slightly extrapolative or trend-chasing agents may destabilize
a model that would be determinate under rationality. These results imply that a
central bank uncertain about the precise nature of heterogeneity may desire policy
robust for all reasonable forms of heterogeneity.
The intuition for these results is clear. The usual ‘Taylor principle’ intuition is that
if nominal interest rates are not adjusted more than one for one with expected inﬂation
then aggregate supply shocks (or self-fulﬁlling shocks to inﬂation expectations) will
be further propagated through lower real rates leading to higher contemporaneous
and future inﬂation. In the heterogeneous expectations case the degree of this future
propagation depends on n and θ (i.e., how strongly adaptive agents extrapolate past
data). In the case of θ < 1, these adaptive beliefs are mean reverting and will not
26further propagate the shock into higher future inﬂation. Thus, a more tepid response
in the nominal interest rate rule is consistent with stabilization. When θ > 1, though,
adaptive agents are trend-following and so inﬂation will be placed on a self-fulﬁlling
path unless policy is particularly vigilant against inﬂation. Notice that this logic
is consistent with policymakers’ concerns that inﬂation expectations might become
unhinged and out of the Fed’s control.23
3.6 Discussion
The monetary policy literature, though wide and diverse, typically settles on the
same recommendation: set policy so that the REE is determinate. At the heart of
this recommendation is the property that a determinate steady state mitigates the
potential for multiple equilibria to cause volatility of inﬂation and output. Our results
indicate that a policy rule designed to implement determinacy may lead to ineﬃcient
outcomes if there exists heterogeneous expectations.24
To illustrate this point in the starkest terms, we parameterized the model so that
it is determinate under rational expectations. We showed that with even a very
small fraction of agents the determinacy properties may be very diﬀerent. If agents
extrapolate past data, then policy set to ensure a determinate REE may lead to
indeterminacy with ineﬃcient inﬂation and output volatility. Therefore, the results
of this paper demonstrate that if policy attempts to achieve a determinate REE in
a New Keynesian model and these heterogeneous expectations dynamics are present,
the policy-maker may unwittingly destabilize the economy. As such, these results are
a cautionary note and suggest that perhaps policy should guard against indeterminacy
in heterogeneous expectations models.
Whether heterogeneity is stabilizing or destabilizing depends on the distribution
and nature of the heterogeneity. If adaptive agents’ expectations are dampening then
policy does not have to be quite as vigilant against inﬂation. Instead, when adap-
tive agents extrapolate or ‘trend-chase’ then policy needs to be even more aggressive
in its stance against inﬂation. These results are intuitive and seem to align with
policymaker concerns such as Bernanke (2004) who emphasizes that adaptive beliefs
becoming untethered from policy changes poses a signiﬁcant challenge. However,
23That values of θ < 1 tend to be stabilizing and θ > 1 tend to indeterminacy and instability
suggests a model where there is parameter learning and dynamic predictor selection. In this setting it
would be interesting to see if in a calibrated version of the model, whether θt would tend to a number
above 1 pushing the economy into the indeterminacy region. This would then add heterogeneous
expectations as a potential explanation of the Great Inﬂation and Moderation. We leave such an
examination to future work.
24It has also been emphasized that policy rules should be chosen so that the associated unique
equilibrium is stable under learning: see for example, Bullard and Mitra (2002), Honkapohja and
Mitra (2005) and Evans and McGough (2005). We note that the rule used to generate the plots in
Figure 8 does produce an equilibrium that is stable under learning.
27there are important open questions such as what speciﬁcation of heterogeneous ex-
pectations is consistent with economic data. The beneﬁt of our approach is that it is
suﬃciently general that it nests many forms of heterogeneity besides rational versus
adaptive. However, the motivating example presented in this Section demonstrates
that heterogeneity can strongly impact a New Keynesian model.
4 Conclusion
This paper derived a heterogeneous expectations version of a New Keynesian model
from a micro-founded monetary economy with nominal rigidities. Importantly, the
heterogeneous expectations model aggregates into a reduced form whose primary
distinction from the representative agent model is that conditional expectations are
replaced by a convex combination of expectation operators. Depending upon the be-
liefs of boundedly rational agents, the New Keynesian aggregate supply relation may
depend on expectations of current and future inﬂation and output. As an example
illustrating the potential implications of our approach, this paper also examined the
impact of expectations heterogeneity on a model’s determinacy properties. Our cen-
tral ﬁndings are two-fold. Heterogeneity may be stabilizing or destabilizing, depend-
ing on the nature of the adaptive expectations mechanism. In case the mechanism is
extrapolative, models which are determinate in case of rationality may be indetermi-
nate and hence exhibit sunspot equilibria in the presence of even a small proportion
of adaptive agents.
The theory presented here aims to bring more realism to a New Keynesian model
while also demonstrating the conditions under which heterogeneous agent behavior
aggregates into a simple reduced form model. Our primary theoretical result is to
show that, under reasonable assumptions on beliefs, it is possible to represent a
heterogeneous agent economy with an aggregate law of motion. From an empirical
viewpoint, our theoretical analysis is important as recent studies have documented
heterogeneous expectations and ‘disagreement’ of beliefs in survey data (e.g. Carroll
(2003), Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003), and Branch (2004)). However, how these
divergent beliefs might impact reduced form relations governing the evolution of the
economy has been an open issue. We illustrate that aggregation is possible, and that
the usual determinacy properties of the New Keynesian model may diﬀer signiﬁcantly.
A question left open here is the extent to which a heterogeneous expectations New
Keynesian model provides a good empirical ﬁt of U.S. time-series.
These results can be linked to the growing call by economists for “robust policy.”
Many authors have argued that in the presence of model uncertainty, policy rules
should be chosen to yield “good” outcomes across possible models, or, perhaps guard
against particularly bad outcomes: see for example Levin and Williams (2003) and
Brock, Durlauf and West (2005). Our results suggest that robustness against the
28impact of heterogeneity in expectations may also be warranted. Policy rules chosen
to implement an equilibrium known to be unique under the assumption of rationality
may result in indeterminacy. Our results are speciﬁc to the functional form of the
expectations operator chosen by adaptive agents, and so, unless the form we analyze
is taken quite seriously, we can oﬀer little guidance as to how robust policy might be
chosen; rather, our work points to the need for an improved theoretical and empirical
understanding of heterogeneous expectations.
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